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Taliban Were thugs and a strategic burden from the begining
The army and civilians alike were shocked and alarmed in early April when the TTP militants taking cover under a controversial peace deal, began occupying strategic locations in Buner, Mingora, Malam Jabba and other parts of Malakand. Their worries multiplied when Taliban militants abducted four Pakistan army commandos in the mountainous Buner valley and eventually executed them. “When the pet develops rabies and starts biting its own mentors, it must be put to sleep, no way around it.” This statement that a senior general involved in military operations in the Northwestern Frontier Province (NWFP) told CRSS in late April suggested a definite new realization — if not change of heart altogether — that as far as the military establishment was concerned, the militants had gone too far; until that point, the army’s claims that it was doing its best to hunt down “miscreants” were met with skepticism across the board. The common perception in Pakistan and elsewhere is that the country’s security establishment — because of old relationships with militant outfits — was only shadow-boxing to impress the world and would not harm those it had once created. But the military’s efforts in the Swat Valley and now in Khyber have helped diminish this view — partially at least. In the process, military officials claim,to 350 soldiers and officers have lost their lives, since the operation in Malakand/Swat region was launched in early May.
Militants being killed:
It was the third major setback for the dreaded outfit since August 5, when a CIA-operated drone missile took out Baitullah Mehsud, the TTP founder and chief. Only a few days after Mehsud’s death, TTP spokesman Maulvi Mohammad Omar was captured in the Mohmand tribal region. Also, the fate of Hakimullah Mehsud, whom the organization’s shura purportedly picked as the new chief on August 25, is still uncertain, with virtually no sign of him since the day he was made the ameer. Similarly, another fierce alqaida aligned TTP leader Maulvi Fazlullah is handicapped by serious wounds and reportedly under siege and probably counting his days as a free icon of terror. Additionally, Shah Dauran, another infamous associate of Fazlullah who used to spread terror through mobile FM radio waves, is also dead.Arrest of the deputy chief thug, Muslim Khan:
The dramatic capture of Muslim Khan and four other Taliban militants in a military-intelligence sting operation on September 3 marked another deadly blow against the embattled Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Muslim Khan, as the spokesman for the TTP in the Swat Valley, had owned up to scores sucide bombings on the security forces and admitted attacks on dozens of girls’ schools in the Swat region. Khan also claimed responsibility on behalf of the TTP for sending two suicide bombers to weapons manufacturing complex — the Pakistan Ordnance Factories near Islamabad — where about 90 people were blown into pieces in one of the deadliest attacks in Pakistan, in April 2008.
Pakistani commandos moved brilliantly to arrest him:
The sting operation became possible only after Kamal Khan, an old acquaintance of Muslim Khan now living in the U.S., agreed to become part of the game; the strategy to capture him aimed to create a façade of negotiations and trap the militants, who had been publicly vowing attacks on pakistani governmet institutions, Kamal Khan and Pakistan’s Military Intelligence, a division of the Pakistani Army, moved in tandem and eventually a raid involving some six dozen commandos resulted in Muslim Khan’s capture at Mangalore, some 12 kilometers from Mingora, the administrative headquarter of the Swat district. “It was purely an intelligence-driven operation,” a senior army official overseeing the operation told CRSS. “It was not a smooth affair. Six of their guards got killed in the firefight that erupted when the commandos moved in.”More good news coming?
Pakistanis writ large therefore expect that the army and the government will remain united and take this war to its logical conclusion i.e. bringing people like Muslim Khan and Hakimullah Mehsud to justice and making them accountable for the deaths and destruction that have taken place in Pakistan since the formation of the TTP in December 2007 will continue to inject new optimism into the security debate and revive confidence in state institutions. And we should not be surprised if, as a result of Muslim Khan’s interrogations, his mentor Maulvi Fazlullah also gets captured — perhaps timed to coincide with President Asif Ali Zardari’s meeting in New York on September 24, at which he is expected to urge world compertate Pakistan for its efforts against extremists, who — under the tutelage of al Qaeda — still pose a grave threat to the entire region.
Now, Pakistan has an honorable working relationship with the US:
Since last September, when the army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani issued a veiled warning against the repeat of a raid by helicopter-borne U.S. Marines in South Waziristan who carried out a ground assault, the level of trust between the two armies has considerably improved, although the U.S. has yet to give Pakistan the Predator drones technology that has taken out several top al Qaeda and Taliban leaders in the country. Intelligence sharing has gone up and so has the coordination, reflected in the presence of a large number U.S. military and intelligence assets in the Waziristan region alongside the Pakistani forces. As a whole, the war against militants seems in full swing; operations against,crimnal calling themselves Taliban in the Khyber Agency and the Pakistan Air Force’s bombardment of suspected militant hideouts in Waziristan continues. So is the push in the Swat region, where large areas have been cleared and handed over to civilian authorities.
People returning home after Taliban’s terrorism:
Another favorable indicator is the return of more than 1.65 million people displaced by the fighting since mid July to their homes in the Malakand region. This underscores that perceptions of the Pakistani military’s complicity with the extremist movements have given way to more confidence in the government and army actions against “miscreants.” And the icing on the cake came with the arrests of Muslim Khan and four other central leaders of the Swat chapter of the TTP, which now appears to be facing defeat by attrition. These captures served as huge psychological booster not only for the civilian administration but also for the forces battling the militants. Mayors of several sub-districts in Swat , particularly those of Kabal, Kooza Bandi, Matta and Chaharbagh, have meanwhile returned from self-imposed exiles in towns such as Peshawar, Mardan and Islamabad to revive public confidence in government institutions. But most mainstream politicians — members of Parliament in particular — still feel insecure and intimidated by militants.
JOHN MUELLER is Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University. Among his books are Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them and the forthcoming Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda.
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George W. Bush led the United States into war in Iraq on the grounds that Saddam Hussein might give his country’s nonexistent weapons of mass destruction to terrorists. Now, Bush’s successor is perpetuating the war in Afghanistan with comparably dubious arguments about the danger posed by the Taliban and al Qaeda.
President Barack obama inssist that the U.S. mission in Afghanistan is about "making sure that al Qaeda cannot attack the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests and our allies" or "project violence against" American citizens. The reasoning is that if the Taliban win in Afghanistan, al Qaeda will once again be able to set up shop there to carry out its dirty work. As the president put it, Afghanistan would "again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can." This argument is constantly repeated but rarely examined; given the costs and risks associated with the Obama administration’s plans for the region, it is time such statements be given the scrutiny they deserve.
Multiple sources, including Lawrence Wright's book The Looming Tower, make clear that the Taliban was a reluctant host to al Qaeda in the 1990s and felt betrayed when the terrorist group repeatedly violated agreements to refrain from issuing inflammatory statements and fomenting violence abroad. Then the al Qaeda-sponsored 9/11 attacks -- which the Taliban had nothing to do with -- led to the toppling of the Taliban’s regime. Given the Taliban’s limited interest in issues outside the "AfPak" region, if they came to power again now, they would be highly unlikely to host provocative terrorist groups whose actions could lead to another outside intervention. And even if al Qaeda were able to relocate to Afghanistan after a Taliban victory there, it would still have to operate under the same siege situation it presently enjoys in what Obama calls its "safe haven" in Pakistan.
The very notion that al Qaeda needs a secure geographic base to carry out its terrorist operations, moreover, is questionable. After all, the operational base for 9/11 was in Hamburg, Germany. Conspiracies involving small numbers of people require communication, money, and planning -- but not a major protected base camp.
In addition, al Qaeda has yet to establish a significant presence in the United States. In 2002, U.S. intelligence reports asserted that the number of trained al Qaeda operatives in the United States was between 2,000 and 5,000, and FBI Director Robert Mueller assured a Senate committee that al Qaeda had "developed a support infrastructure" in the country and achieved both "the ability and the intent to inflict significant casualties in the U.S. with little warning." However, after years of well funded sleuthing, the FBI and other investigative agencies have been unable to uncover a single true al Qaeda sleeper cell or operative within the country. Mueller's rallying cry has now been reduced to a comparatively bland formulation: "We believe al Qaeda is still seeking to infiltrate operatives into the U.S. from overseas."
Even that may not be true. Since 9/11, some two million foreigners have been admitted to the United States legally and many others, of course, have entered illegally. Even if border security has been so effective that 90 percent of al Qaeda’s operatives have been turned away or deterred from entering the United States, some should have made it in -- and some of those, it seems reasonable to suggest, would have been picked up by law enforcement by now. The lack of attacks inside the United States combined with the inability of the FBI to find any potential attackers suggests that the terrorists are either not trying very hard or are far less clever and capable than usually depicted.
Policymakers and the public at large should keep in mind the words of Glenn Carle, a 23 year veteran of the CIA who served as deputy national intelligence officer for transnational threats: "We must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed and miserable opponents that they are." Al Qaeda "has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing and leading a terrorist operation," Carle notes, and "its capabilities are far inferior to its desires."
President Obama has said that there is also a humanitarian element to the Afghanistan mission. A return of the Taliban, he points out, would condemn the Afghan people "to brutal governance, international isolation, a paralyzed economy, and the denial of basic human rights." This concern is legitimate -- the Afghan people appear to be quite strongly opposed to a return of the Taliban, and they are surely entitled to some peace after 30 years of almost continual warfare, much of it imposed on them from outside.
The problem, as Obama is doubtlessly well aware, is that Americans are far less willing to sacrifice lives for missions that are essentially humanitarian than for those that seek to deal with a threat directed at the United States itself. People who embrace the idea of a humanitarian mission will continue to support Obama's policy in Afghanistan -- at least if they think it has a chance of success -- but many Americans (and Europeans) will increasingly start to question how many lives such a mission is worth.
This questioning, in fact, is well under way. Because of its ties to 9/11, the war in Afghanistan has enjoyed considerably greater public supports than the war in Iraq did (or, for that matter, the wars in Korea or Vietnam). However, there has been a considerable dropoff in that support of late. If Obama's national security justification for his war in Afghanistan comes to seem as spurious as Bush's national security justification for his war in Iraq, he, like Bush, will increasingly have only the humanitarian argument to fall back on. And that is likely to be a weak reed.
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George W. Bush led the United States into war in Iraq on the grounds that Saddam Hussein might give his country’s nonexistent weapons of mass destruction to terrorists. Now, Bush’s successor is perpetuating the war in Afghanistan with comparably dubious arguments about the danger posed by the Taliban and al Qaeda.
President Barack obama inssist that the U.S. mission in Afghanistan is about "making sure that al Qaeda cannot attack the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests and our allies" or "project violence against" American citizens. The reasoning is that if the Taliban win in Afghanistan, al Qaeda will once again be able to set up shop there to carry out its dirty work. As the president put it, Afghanistan would "again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can." This argument is constantly repeated but rarely examined; given the costs and risks associated with the Obama administration’s plans for the region, it is time such statements be given the scrutiny they deserve.
Multiple sources, including Lawrence Wright's book The Looming Tower, make clear that the Taliban was a reluctant host to al Qaeda in the 1990s and felt betrayed when the terrorist group repeatedly violated agreements to refrain from issuing inflammatory statements and fomenting violence abroad. Then the al Qaeda-sponsored 9/11 attacks -- which the Taliban had nothing to do with -- led to the toppling of the Taliban’s regime. Given the Taliban’s limited interest in issues outside the "AfPak" region, if they came to power again now, they would be highly unlikely to host provocative terrorist groups whose actions could lead to another outside intervention. And even if al Qaeda were able to relocate to Afghanistan after a Taliban victory there, it would still have to operate under the same siege situation it presently enjoys in what Obama calls its "safe haven" in Pakistan.
The very notion that al Qaeda needs a secure geographic base to carry out its terrorist operations, moreover, is questionable. After all, the operational base for 9/11 was in Hamburg, Germany. Conspiracies involving small numbers of people require communication, money, and planning -- but not a major protected base camp.
Given the Taliban’s limited interest in issues outside the “AfPak” region, if it came to power again now, it would be highly unlikely to host provocative terrorist groups whose actions could lead to another outside intervention.
At present, al Qaeda consist of a few hundred people running around in Pakistan, seeking to avoid detection and helping the Taliban when possible. It also has a disjointed network of fellow travelers around the globe who communicate over the Internet. Over the last decade, the group has almost completely discredited itself in the Muslim world due to the fallout from the 9/11 attacks and subsequent counterproductive terrorism, much of it directed against Muslims. No convincing evidence has been offered publicly to show that al Qaeda Central has put together a single full operation anywhere in the world since 9/11. And, outside of war zones, the violence perpetrated by al Qaeda affiliates, wannabes, and lookalikes combined has resultes in the deaths of some 200 to 300 people per year, and may be decliamings. That is 200 to 300 too many, of course, but it scarcely suggests that "the safety of people around the world is at stake," as Obama dramatically puts it. In addition, al Qaeda has yet to establish a significant presence in the United States. In 2002, U.S. intelligence reports asserted that the number of trained al Qaeda operatives in the United States was between 2,000 and 5,000, and FBI Director Robert Mueller assured a Senate committee that al Qaeda had "developed a support infrastructure" in the country and achieved both "the ability and the intent to inflict significant casualties in the U.S. with little warning." However, after years of well funded sleuthing, the FBI and other investigative agencies have been unable to uncover a single true al Qaeda sleeper cell or operative within the country. Mueller's rallying cry has now been reduced to a comparatively bland formulation: "We believe al Qaeda is still seeking to infiltrate operatives into the U.S. from overseas."
Even that may not be true. Since 9/11, some two million foreigners have been admitted to the United States legally and many others, of course, have entered illegally. Even if border security has been so effective that 90 percent of al Qaeda’s operatives have been turned away or deterred from entering the United States, some should have made it in -- and some of those, it seems reasonable to suggest, would have been picked up by law enforcement by now. The lack of attacks inside the United States combined with the inability of the FBI to find any potential attackers suggests that the terrorists are either not trying very hard or are far less clever and capable than usually depicted.
Policymakers and the public at large should keep in mind the words of Glenn Carle, a 23 year veteran of the CIA who served as deputy national intelligence officer for transnational threats: "We must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed and miserable opponents that they are." Al Qaeda "has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing and leading a terrorist operation," Carle notes, and "its capabilities are far inferior to its desires."
President Obama has said that there is also a humanitarian element to the Afghanistan mission. A return of the Taliban, he points out, would condemn the Afghan people "to brutal governance, international isolation, a paralyzed economy, and the denial of basic human rights." This concern is legitimate -- the Afghan people appear to be quite strongly opposed to a return of the Taliban, and they are surely entitled to some peace after 30 years of almost continual warfare, much of it imposed on them from outside.
The problem, as Obama is doubtlessly well aware, is that Americans are far less willing to sacrifice lives for missions that are essentially humanitarian than for those that seek to deal with a threat directed at the United States itself. People who embrace the idea of a humanitarian mission will continue to support Obama's policy in Afghanistan -- at least if they think it has a chance of success -- but many Americans (and Europeans) will increasingly start to question how many lives such a mission is worth.
This questioning, in fact, is well under way. Because of its ties to 9/11, the war in Afghanistan has enjoyed considerably greater public supports than the war in Iraq did (or, for that matter, the wars in Korea or Vietnam). However, there has been a considerable dropoff in that support of late. If Obama's national security justification for his war in Afghanistan comes to seem as spurious as Bush's national security justification for his war in Iraq, he, like Bush, will increasingly have only the humanitarian argument to fall back on. And that is likely to be a weak reed.
